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Abstract: We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private infor-
mation on the game’s payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on
each other’s private information. We show that once agents possess these different types
of information, there exists a coordination game in the evaluation of this information.
And even though the precisions of both signal types is exogenous, the precision with which
agents predict each other’s actions at equilibrium turns out to be endogenous. As a conse-
quence, we find that there exist multiple equilibria if the private signals’ precision is high.
These equilibria differ with regard to the way that agents weight their private information
to reason about each other’s actions.
Keywords: Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection, Primary Signals, Sec-
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1 Introduction
It is the nature of coordination games that one player’s payoff depends not only on his
own action, but also on the action of others. And if players can observe each other’s
actions, this interdependence induces multiple equilibria. The same is not necessarily
true in environments where agents have only probabilistic knowledge over each other’s
1We thank Martin Hellwig for comments and for spotting an error. We also received helpful comments
and questions from Brian Cooper and seminar participants in Bonn.
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actions. Harsanyi (1973) and Selten (1975) develop frameworks where one player cannot
observe the other player’s payoffs, respectively, where players may “tremble”, and show
that the number of equilibria can be drastically reduced. Such imperfect knowledge
regarding the other player’s actions arises naturally in the games of Rubinstein (1989) and
Carlsson and van Damme (1993), where both players receive noisy private information
over an unknown coefficient that characterizes the game’s payoffs. In such models, players
face payoff uncertainty as in Harsanyi (1973). At the same time, due to their imperfect
private knowledge of the payoffs, they tremble as in Selten (1975). Moreover, the models
of Rubinstein (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993) predict that players will play a
unique risk-dominant equilibrium rather than the multiple equilibria that they would play
if actions and payoffs were common knowledge. The present paper studies this selection
mechanism in the context of a more general information structure. We show that once
agents possess different types of private information, there exists a coordination game in
the evaluation of this information. And even though the precisions of both signal types
is exogenous, the precision with which agents predict each other’s actions at equilibrium
turns out to be endogenous. As a consequence, there exist multiple equilibria if the private
signals’ precision is high.
More precisely, the players of Rubinstein (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
reason only indirectly about each other. They receive a signal regarding the game’s
payoffs, which they use to update their beliefs regarding the game’s coefficients. Second,
knowing that the other agent’s signal is correlated with their own, they use their signal to
infer the other player’s posterior beliefs. In the present paper, we argue that players
usually know more than that. Often players can observe directly parts of the other
player’s observation. That is, in the context of the coordinated attack interpretation of the
Rubinstein (1989) “electronic mail game”, the general may observe that his messenger is
off to a “good start” since he already managed to cross the first valley. Thus, the chances
that he eventually arrives at the other camp are better than usual. Put differently,
the sender of the “primary message” knows that the other player most likely received a
message indicating that a particular game was chosen. Or, alternatively, one general can
observe from a distance that someone entered the other general’s camp. While he cannot
be sure whether it was his messenger or someone else, this observation induces him to
revise upward the probability with which the other general received the news. On the
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other hand, if the sender sees that the messenger is off to a bad start, then he knows that
it is less likely that the message will reach its receiver. The main result of the paper shows
that such a generalized information structure induces multiple equilibria. If one player
conditions his actions on the “primary signal”, which informs him of the particular game
chosen by nature, the other player will have an incentive to condition on his “secondary
signal”, which informs him of the “primary signal” that the other player received, and
vice versa. Such asymmetric evaluation of signals will maximize the precision with which
players can anticipate each other’s actions. That is, even though the precision of both
signal types is exogenous, the precision with which agents anticipate each other’s actions
at equilibrium turns out to be endogenous. And there will exist multiple equilibria that
differ regarding the way that agents weight the different types of private information that
they receive, to reason about each other’s actions.
In the present note, we formalize this intuition in the context of the Rubinstein (1989)
electronic mail game. First, we introduce the basic information structure, where agents
purely rely on the correlation of their private observations to infer the other agent’s beliefs.
That is, in equilibrium, agents rely on the fact that they did not receive a confirmation
of their last message, which may mean either that their last message did not reach the
receiver, or that the receiver’s reply was lost. Within this setting, we recall the main
insight, namely that agents play a unique risk-dominant equilibrium. In the following,
we refer to the basic signals from the electronic mail game as primary signals. In the
main part of this note, we introduce a secondary signal which allows agents to make
additional inference on the other agent’s observations. That is, we introduce a noisy
signal that allows players to infer directly the probability with which their signal reached
the receiver. For the modified setting, we find that if players observe each other’s signal
with great precision, then they can coordinate on multiple equilibria.
To interpret our findings, we compare two classes of equilibria: (i) symmetric equilibria
and (ii) asymmetric equilibria. The distinguishing feature of a symmetric equilibrium will
be that agents weight their two signal types equally. In an asymmetric equilibrium one
agent leans heavily on the secondary signal, while the other agent has an incentive to lean
heavily on his primary signal and vice versa. The key feature is therefore that the two
signals are “cross complements”. That is, if player one relies heavily on his secondary
signal, then the other player has an incentive to rely on his primary signal. Such an
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asymmetric weighting of private signals enables agents to maximize the precision with
which they can forecast each other’s actions. Finally, to emphasize the importance of the
class of asymmetric equilibria, we show that asymmetric equilibria dominate symmetric
equilibria on efficiency grounds.
The main contribution of the present paper is the introduction of a new class of private
signals. Namely, signals about the other player’s signals. Moreover, we show that such in-
formation can ensure multiple equilibria once private signals are sufficiently precise. Com-
pared to the literature, we note that Rubinstein (1989), Carlsson and van Damme (1993),
and Frankel et al. (2003) have studied two-action coordination games, where agents re-
ceive what we call primary signals that allow them to make inference on the game’s
unknown coefficients.2 Moreover, through the correlation of private information, agents
can reason about each other’s posteriors and actions. Regarding equilibrium selection,
these studies predict that unique equilibria are ensured once private signals are sufficiently
precise. The present example shows that the existence of secondary private signals can
invert this finding: multiple equilibria are ensured once the private signals are sufficiently
precise.
Regarding different types of signals, Morris and Shin (2004), Hellwig (2002), Metz
(2002), and Angeletos and Werning (2006) emphasize the role of public signals/common
priors in the global games framework, showing that such signals restore equilibrium multi-
plicity if public signals are sufficiently precise compared to the private signal; we give an ex-
ample where multiplicity arises in pure private signal environments. A further class of sig-
nals was introduced by Minelli and Polemarchakis (2003), Angeletos and Werning (2006),
and Dasgupta (2007), who study environments where agents observe each other’s actions.
Such signals tend to induce unique equilibria in the two-player games of Minelli and Polemarchakis
(2003), where signals over each other’s actions are perfectly revealing. Angeletos and Werning
(2006), and Dasgupta (2007) study public signals that partially reveal the other player’s
actions. They show that multiplicity may emerge if the public signal is of high qual-
ity. Kuhle (2013) gives an example where the public signal’s quality reduces the number
of equilibria. Finally, Rubinstein (1989) points out that equilibrium multiplicity may
2See Frankel et al. (2003) for a broad literature overview on equilibrium selection through what we
call primary signals. Carlsson and van Damme (1993), pp. 1008-1010, for a detailed comparison of their
“global games”, which rely on continuous distributions, with the “electronic mail game” and its discrete
information structure.
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reemerge once there is a technical upper bound for the number of exchanged messages.
Similarly, multiplicity also obtains in the model of Binmore and Samuelson (2001), where
agents can decide whether or not to send electronic messages which are costly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our electronic mail
game. In Section 2.1, we recall the uniqueness result for our modified game without
secondary signals. Section 3 contains the main result. Sections 4 concludes.
2 A symmetric electronic mail game
There are two players 1 and 2. Each has two actions A and B to choose from. And there
is uncertainty about which game Ga or Gb the two players are going to play. Games a and
b differ regarding their payoffs. Nature selects game a with probability 1− p and game b
with probability p < 1
2
. The game’s payoff structures are:
Game Ga
A B
A M,M 0,−L
B −L, 0 0, 0
Game Gb
A B
A 0, 0 0,−L
B −L, 0 M,M
Moreover, we assume L > M > 0. Hence, players face a coordination problem in both
states of the world: if players coordinate on actions A (B) in state a (b), they receive M
each, while coordination on B (A) yields 0 to both players. However, if players fail to
coordinate, i.e., choose different actions, then the player who plays B receives −L, and the
payoff for playing A is 0. Players receive private information on the game’s fundamental
before they choose an action. The probability p, the payoff structure, and the forthcoming
communication protocol are common knowledge among players.
In state a, both players get information T1 = T2 = 0. In state b, one player is randomly
selected with probability 1
2
, and informed of the true state b. The selected player i then
sends a message to player j. The message, however, is lost with probability ε. Upon
receiving a message, player j sends a confirmation back to player i which is also lost
with probability ε. These messages are exchanged until finally one message is lost and
communication ends. Players 1 and 2 now choose their actions based on the number of
messages T1 and T2 that they received.
The present game therefore differs from the Rubinstein (1989) game in that it is
random which player spots the actual game selected, and starts to inform the other player.
5
Moreover, we assume that both players do not know who was selected to send the first
message.3 This symmetric structure accommodates a more natural interpretation of the
asymmetric equilibria that players play once we introduce secondary signals that inform
players about each other’s primary signals T1 and T2. That is, to bring out the source
of multiple asymmetric equilibria, we endow players with signals of identical precisions
and, unlike Rubinstein (1989), assume that the probability with which they observe the
true state of nature, is the same (1/2) across players. The propositions in this paper
regarding the existence of multiple asymmetric equilibria continue to hold once we set the
probability with which player 1 observes the true state of nature to one as in Rubinstein
(1989). Finally, in the context of the coordinated attack interpretation of the electronic
mail game, it seems natural that players do not necessarily know that “player 1” always
observes the true state of nature first. As such, the present specification may be seen as
less restrictive.
2.1 No direct information on the other player’s information
Before turning to our main result, we establish the uniqueness result of Rubinstein (1989)
for our symmetric mail game.
Proposition 1. There exists only one equilibrium in which player 1 plays A in the state
of nature a. In this equilibrium, both players play A, irrespective of the number of received
messages T1 and T2.
Proof. See Appendix A for the proof by forward induction.
Proposition 1 recalls the inductive equilibrium selection mechanism that operates
through higher-order beliefs: If player 1 plays always A for T1 = 0, then player 2 also
plays A, and this equilibrium procreates to games, where Ti > 0, i = 1, 2. That is, even
though both players Ti > 0, i = 1, 2 know that game b was selected, players still play
(A,A), despite the fact that (B,B) would be payoff-dominant. However, as in Rubinstein
(1989), there exists a second equilibrium, where both players play (B,B), receiving a
zero payoff both all the time. This equilibrium can be removed once the (B,B) payoff
in game Ga is negative, rather than 0, for both players. In this case, there exists only
3In Appendix D, we derive our main result for the original Rubinstein (1989) game, where player 1 is
informed of the state of nature with probability 1.
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one unique equilibrium, where both players play A. Such a modification of payoffs, which
may be introduced throughout the paper, would bring us closer to the formulation of
Carlsson and van Damme (1993), where there exist unique strict equilibria for certain
signal values.4
3 Information on the other player’s information
Let us now add a secondary signal Z1 and Z2 as another source of private information:
player i not only gets information Ti but also observes
Zi :=

 Tj with probability 1− ψTj + 1 with probability ψ .
The secondary signal Z1 informs player 1 of the primary signal T2 that player 2 received.
As such, the secondary signal carries two types of information. First, it allows player 1 to
reason about the true fundamental of the game. That is, through its dependence on T2,
Z1 is correlated with nature’s choice of a fundamental. Second, and more importantly, Z1
allows player 1 to look directly at T2. In turn, this direct look at T2 informs him about
the probability with which player 2 plays A or B. In the following main propositions 3, 5
and 6, we show that this “direct look” at the other player’s signal will induce asymmetric
equilibria, in which players weight their signals Z and T differently. That is, if player
1 conditions his actions mainly on his primary signal T1, then player 2 will have an
incentive to weight signal Z2 heavily and vice versa. Put differently, the signals Ti, Zj are
complements, while the signals Ti, Tj are substitutes.
To underscore the significance of these asymmetric equilibria, we proceed in three
steps. First, we show that they exist. Second, we describe the symmetric equilibria, where
agents weight their signals symmetrically. Third, we show that the asymmetric equilibria
welfare-dominate symmetric equilibria. Before we study the asymmetric equilibria, we
note that the Rubinstein (1989) equilibrium carries over to the environment where agents
receive primary and secondary signals.
Proposition 2. When information Z1 and Z2 are available to players, there exists an
equilibrium in which both players play A irrespective of the information received.
4See Carlsson and van Damme (1993), pp. 1008-1010, for a detailed discussion of the relation between
global games and mail games.
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Proof. Suppose player 1 thinks that player 2 plays A for sure. Irrespective of (T1, Z1),
the following holds: Choosing B will yield a payoff −L, while taking action A will secure
him a payoff of M . The same argument can be made for player 2, and thus we have
established that the strategy profile (A,A) is an equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, both players receive a zero payoff, even in those situations where
they know that playing (B,B) would yield a higher payoff. However, players can use their
private signals to coordinate on an alternative class of equilibria:
Proposition 3. If the secondary signals’ precision is sufficiently high (ψ sufficiently
small), there exist two asymmetric threshold equilibria for every n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}. In
one equilibrium, player 1 plays B if and only if T1 ≥ n+ 1 and Z1 ≥ n; player 2 plays B
if and only if Z2 ≥ n + 1 and T2 ≥ n. In the second equilibrium player 1 plays B if and
only if Z1 ≥ n+1 and T2 ≥ n and player 2 plays B if and only if T2 ≥ n+1 and Z2 ≥ n.
Proof. Let us consider the first equilibrium with cutoff n.
1. Take the behavior of player 2 as given. There are three cases to consider:
(a) T1 < n: Player 1 is sure that Z2 ≤ n and hence plays A.
(b) T1 = n: With probability 1−ψ (ψ) player 2’s information is Z2 = n (Z2 = n+1).
Playing A secures a payoff of zero for sure; playing B yields an expected payoff
larger than (1−ψ)(−L) +ψM , which is the first player’s payoff from B, when
player 2 always plays B given Z2 > n. Thus, for ψ ≤
L
L+M
=: ψ1 playing A is
optimal.
(c) T1 ≥ n+1: Player 1 is sure that Z2 ≥ n+1 and T2 ≥ n, hence finds it optimal
to play B.
2. Equivalently, now take the behavior of player 1 as given.
(a) Z2 ≤ n: Player 2 knows that T1 ≤ n, and thus plays A.
(b) Z2 > n+ 1: Player 2 knows that T1 ≥ n+ 1, and thus plays B.
(c) Z2 = n+ 1: Here we have to take care of four subcases:
i. T2 = n− 1: Hence T1 = n for sure and player 2 thus chooses A.
8
ii. T2 = n: Defining λψ := P (T1 ≤ n|T2 = n ∧ Z2 = n + 1) =
ψ
ψ+ 1−ǫ
2
(1−ψ)
, the
payoff for playing B can be written as λψ(−L)+ (1−λψ)M . From this we
obtain a boundary ψ2 :=
(1−ǫ)M
2L−(1−ǫ)M
> 0, which ensures that for all ψ ≤ ψ2
playing B is optimal for player 2. That is, for ψ ≤ ψ2 the expected payoff
of playing B is non-negative.
iii. T2 = n+1: We can repeat the same argument using µψ := P (T1 ≤ n|T2 =
n + 1 ∧ Z2 = n + 1) =
ψ
ψ+(1−ǫ)(1−ψ)
. It holds that µψ < λψ, such that for
all ψ ≤ ψ2 playing B is optimal for player 2.
iv. T2 = n+ 2: Hence T1 = n+ 1 for sure, and player 2 chooses B.
Again, we can choose ψ sufficiently small, i.e. ψ ≤ min{ψ1, ψ2}, such that the strategy
profile from the proposition is indeed an equilibrium.
The second part of the proposition follows immediately from changing the roles of
player 1 and 2.
To interpret the equilibria in Proposition 3 we note that players weight primary and
secondary signals asymmetrically. That is, if player 1 switches from playing A to playing
B for signal pairs T1 ≥ n+1, Z1 ≥ n, then player 2 switches from A to B for signal values
T2 ≥ n, Z2 ≥ n + 1. And, as the proof shows, signals where the trigger strategy requires
values greater or equal n+1 carry the main information regarding the other player’s signals
and actions. On the contrary, signals where the trigger strategy requires values greater or
equal n carry little information on other player’s signals. More precisely, player 1 relies
in his inference about the other player’s action on the fact that T1 ≥ n+1 informs him of
the fact that T2 ≥ n, Z2 ≥ n+ 1. Hence, player 1 relies on his primary signal to infer the
action of player 2. The main reason for player 1’s reliance on his primary signal T1, is that
player 2 conditions his actions on T2 ≥ n, Z2 ≥ n+1. That is, as the steps 2.(c)i−iv in the
proof show, player 2 relies on his secondary signal to infer the action of player 1. In turn,
player 1’s reliance on the secondary signal 1 justifies player 2’s reliance on the primary
signal... This complementarity between player 1’s primary and player 2’s secondary signal
ensures that asymmetric weighting of signals is an equilibrium. Put differently, players
face a coordination game in the weighting of their private signals; players can choose their
cutoff values Ti, Zi in a way that makes it easy for their counterpart to assess whether
their requirement for playing B is met or not. In the present case, this means leaning on
the primary signal once the opponent leans on the secondary signal and vice versa.
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The main purpose of the following propositions 4-6 is to emphasize this point further.
First, we show that there also exist symmetric equilibria, where agents weight their signals
equally. Moreover, we show that not every configuration of cutoffs is an equilibrium.
Second, we show in proposition 5 that the coordination game in the evaluation of private
signals ensures multiple equilibria once private signals are of high quality. Finally, to
bring-out the fact that the precision with which agents can anticipate each others actions
is endogenous, we show in proposition 6 that the asymmetric equilibria, where agents
exploit the complementarity between primary and secondary signals, welfare dominate
the symmetric equilibria of proposition 4.
Proposition 4. If the secondary signals’ precision is sufficiently high, there exist sym-
metric monotone equilibria for every n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }, where players weight their signals
equally such that both players play B if and only if Ti ≥ n+1 and Zi ≥ n+1. There exist
no symmetric monotone equilibria, where both players play B if and only if Ti ≥ n + 1
and Zi ≥ n+ 2 (or Ti ≥ n+ 2 and Zi ≥ n+ 1).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Up to now we have shown that our main results hold for a given probability ǫ that
a message between the players is lost. One might suspect5 that equilibrium multiplicity
depends on the relative precision of primary and secondary signals, i.e., a high ǫ/ψ ratio
may be required. The following proposition shows that this is not the case:
Proposition 5. There exist upper bounds ǫ¯ > 0 and ψ¯ > 0, such that the equilibria
described in propositions 3 and 4 exist for all combinations of ǫ ≤ ǫ¯ and ψ ≤ ψ¯.
Proof. For propositions 3 and 4 to hold, we need a sufficiently small error probability for
the secondary signal, i.e., ψ ≤ min[ψ1, ψ2, ψ3], where ψ1 =
L
L+M
, ψ2 =
(1−ǫ)M
2L−(1−ǫ)M
, and
ψ3 =
(1−ǫ)M
L+(1−ǫ)M
. It therefore suffices for show that the limits of ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 for ǫ → 0 are
positive: First, observe that ψ1 is positive and does not depend on ǫ. Second, lim
ǫ→0
ψ2 =
M
2L−M
> 0. Finally, lim
ǫ→0
ψ3 =
M
L+M
> 0.
This demonstrates, that our results differ fundamentally from those obtained by
Rubinstein (1989), Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Frankel et al. (2003), and Morris and Shin
5In the public and private information frameworks of Hellwig (2002), Morris and Shin (2004), and
Angeletos and Werning (2006), multiple equilibria emerge once public signals or priors are sufficiently
precise relative to private signals.
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(2007), where equilibrium selection works best once private information is very precise.
The present analysis, in particular Proposition 3, shows that once agents receive different
types of information there emerges a coordination game in the evaluation of this informa-
tion. And this incentive to coordinate is particularly strong once private signals are very
informative.
In the introduction, we argued that the asymmetric equilibria derived here deserve
special scrutiny. We believe that the main reason for this lies in the following
Proposition 6. If the secondary private signals are very precise, the asymmetric equilibria
described in Proposition 3 for n = 1 welfare-dominate those where n > 1. And, more
importantly, the asymmetric equilibria of Proposition 3 welfare-dominate the symmetric
ones of Proposition 4 for every given cutoff n.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 6 emphasizes the complementarity between primary and secondary signal
that gave rise to the asymmetric equilibria of proposition 3: Private signals of high quality
induce for players to coordinate on an equilibrium, where they exploit the complementarity
between primary and secondary signals to reduce losses that occur in cases where nature
selects game b, but players play (A,A), or, worse, (A,B).
4 Discussion
The players of Rubinstein (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993) rely on a very
particular type of information. Players can only reason indirectly about each other’s
trembling behavior because the private information on the game’s unknown coefficient, is
correlated. That is, players purely rely on the knowledge that the other player is looking
at the same game. They cannot make direct inference on what the other player thinks
of the game. In reality, we argue that there are many environments where players know
more than that. In the coordinated attack interpretation of the mail game, players may
observe directly that their messenger is off to a “bad start”, in which case it is unlikely
that he will deliver his message. Similarly, one general may see that someone is leaving
the other general’s camp, which leads him to believe that the other general is trying to
send him a message. If, in turn, no message arrives, it is likely that game b was selected,
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but that the primary message was lost. The analysis of such an information structure that
comprises “primary signals”, as in the Rubinstein (1989) game and “secondary signals”,
which inform players of the chance that their primary messages were received, indicates
that more general signal structures can reverse the intended equilibrium selection effect:
multiple equilibria are ensured once private information is very precise.
In the present example, we find that players face a coordination game regarding the
way that they use their information to reason about each other’s actions. Put differently,
the extent to which player i trembles from the perspective of player j depends on the way
that i weights his information and vice versa. Accordingly, signals with heterogeneous
informational content induce a coordination game with regard to the way that agents
evaluate their information. In the present specification, there is a complementarity be-
tween player i’s primary signal and player j’s secondary signal: if i leans on his primary
signal, then j can forecast i’s tremble best through the secondary signal and vice versa.
As we show, this complementarity gives rise to two classes of equilibria. Moreover, within
each equilibrium class, there exists a countably infinite number of equilibria if the private
signal’s precisions are large. That is, while precise private signals ensure uniqueness in
Rubinstein (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993), they ensure multiplicity in the
present class of games. Finally, the asymmetric equilibria that arise under the present
extended signal structure cannot be dismissed on efficiency grounds. In the current model
asymmetric equilibria dominate symmetric ones in terms of efficiency.
The current analysis is confined to the simple Rubinstein (1989) game with its discrete
information structure. This restriction allows us to give a constructive proof for the exis-
tence of asymmetric equilibria and it allows us to make a welfare comparison showing that
asymmetric equilibria welfare-dominate their symmetric counterparts. A generalization
to the continuous “global games” structure is therefore left for future research.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is parallel to the one in Rubinstein (1989). First, we establish that player i
plays A when Ti = 0. Player i considers two possible scenarios:
1. With probability (1− p), game Ga is played.
2. With probability 1
2
pǫ, Player j was selected, game Gb is played, and the message
from player j to player i was lost.
Hence, we find a lower bound A˜ for i’s payoff from playing A and an upper bound B˜ for
i’s payoff from playing B:
π(A) ≥
(1− p)M + 1
2
pǫ0
(1− p) + 1
2
pǫ
=: A˜ π(B) ≤
−(1− p)L+ 1
2
pǫM
(1− p) + 1
2
pǫ
=: B˜
It holds that A˜ > B˜, and thus player i plays A. The induction step from t − 1 to t
is identical to the original Rubinstein one: assume that both players play A when they
receive a Ti < t. Consider that player i gets information Ti = t. For the following
argument we denote the probability that player i was informed first that game Gb is
played by κt ∈ [0, 1]. The posterior probability of player j having received information
Tj = t− 1 is given by
zt :=
κtǫ+ 1− κt
κt(ǫ+ (1− ǫ)ǫ) + 1− κt
>
1
2
.
In other words, the posterior probability of player j playing A is larger than 1
2
, and thus
playing A is optimal for player i as well: Playing A yields 0, while playing B has expected
payoff zt(−L) + (1− zt)M < 0.
B Proof of Proposition 4
We start by proving the first statement. Without loss of generality, we have to check only
if player i’s best response to player j’s equilibrium strategy is consistent with player i’s
equilibrium strategy. We have to check the following cases of information that player i
might receive:
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1. Zi ≤ n: Player i knows that Tj ≤ Zi ≤ n and that j player A, hence plays A.
2. Zi = n+ 1:
(a) Ti = n: player i knows that Zj = n and that player j plays A, which leads j
to play A as well.
(b) Ti = n + 1: Clearly Zj ≥ n + 1 and Tj ∈ {n, n + 1}. To determine the payoff
of playing B, the conditional distribution of Tj has to be taken into account:
(1− ǫ)2nǫψ
(1− ǫ)2nǫψ + (1 − ǫ)2n+1ǫ(1− ψ)
(−L) +
(1− ǫ)2n+1ǫ(1− ψ)
(1 − ǫ)2nǫψ + (1− ǫ)2n+1ǫ(1− ψ)
M .
Hence playing B is optimal if ψ < ψ3 :=
(1−ǫ)M
L+(1−ǫ)M
.
(c) Ti > n+1: thus Zj ≥ n+2 and Tj ≥ n+2. Player j plays B and the optimal
response of i is B.
3. Zi = n+ 2: Player i knows that Tj ≥ n+ 1.
(a) Zi = n+ 2 implies that Ti < n is not feasible.
(b) Ti = n: Zj ≥ n + 1 with probability ψ, hence the payoff of playing B is
(1 − ψ)(−L) + ψM , which is negative for ψ < ψ1, the case when playing A is
optimal for player i.
(c) Ti > n: Therefore Zj ≥ n+ 1 for sure, and thus both players play B.
4. Zi > n+ 2: Player i knows that Tj ≥ Zi − 1 > n + 1. It also holds that Ti ≥ n + 1
and thus Zj ≥ n + 1. Therefore player j plays B and player i’s best response is to
play B as well.
Hence we have established the first part of the proposition for ψ ≤ min{ψ1, ψ3}.
To prove the second part of the proposition we provide a counter example: Suppose
Z1 = n+1 and T1 = n+2: player 1 now plays A. This is not a best response since player
1 knows that T2 ≥ n+ 1 and Z2 ≥ n+ 2, and thus that 2 plays B with certainty. Hence,
equilibria where players play B iff Ti ≥ n+ 1 and Zi ≥ n+ 2 cannot exist.
C Proof of Proposition 6
We will compute the total welfare loss in the asymmetric equilibria of Proposition 3 given
n (sum of expected surplus losses of player 1 and 2) compared to hypothetical perfect
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coordination between both players. Note that in state a neither miscoordination nor
coordination on the wrong action can occur. In state b
1. coordination on the wrong action (A,A) happens with probability
p
[
1− (1− ǫ)2(n−1) + (1− ǫ)2(n−1)ǫ(1 + (1− ψ)(1− ǫ)) +
1
2
(1− ǫ)2n(1− ψ)
]
2. miscoordination (B,A) happens when T1 = n, T2 ≥ n, and Z2 = n + 1. The
associated probability is p(1− ǫ)2n−1ǫψ.
Using this, we can compute the welfare loss in equilibrium:
ln := p
{
(1− ǫ)2n−1ǫψ(2M + L)
+
[
1− (1− ǫ)2(n−1) + (1− ǫ)2(n−1)ǫ(1 + (1 − ψ)(1− ǫ)) +
1
2
(1 − ǫ)2n(1− ψ)
]
2M
}
= p(1− ǫ)2n−1
{
ǫψ(2M + L) +
[
−1 + ǫ(1 + (1− ψ)(1 − ǫ)) +
1
2
(1− ǫ)2(1− ψ)
]
2M
}
+ p2M .
It is straightforward to see that the expression in curly brackets is negative for small ψ.
Hence, ln is increasing in n for small ψ.
The remaining part of the proof requires computing the welfare loss in the symmetric
equilibria of Proposition 3 given n. Again there are two types of losses:
1. coordination on the wrong action (A,A) happens with probability
p
[
1− (1− ǫ)2n + (1− ǫ)2nǫ(1− ψ)
]
2. miscoordination (B,A) happens once T1 = n, T2 ≥ n, and Z2 = n + 1. Hence it
happens with probability p(1− ǫ)2(n−1)ǫψ.
Using these probabilities, we compute the welfare loss in equilibrium:
l˜n = p(1− ǫ)
2(n−1)
{
ǫψ(2M + L) + (1− ǫ)2 [−1 + ǫ(1 − ψ)] 2M
}
+ p2M
Note that ln − l˜n −−→
ψ→0
−p(1 − ǫ)2nǫM < 0. Hence, for a small enough ψ it holds that
ln < l˜n, i.e., welfare is higher in the asymmetric equilibria given n.
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D Referee appendix
In this appendix we show that our main result, multiplicity of equilibria in the presence of
primary and secondary signals, holds for the original asymmetric version of the electronic
mail game of Rubinstein (1989). That is, we now assume that it is always player 1 who
gets informed first, i.e., gets a message in case nature draws game b. Equivalently, we set
the probability P , with which player 1 is informed first to P = 1 (rather than 1/2, which
is what we assumed in the main text). Other than that leave the signals Z, T unchanged.
Our only deviation from Rubinstein (1989) is therefore the introduction of the secondary
signal Z. Naturally, Proposition 2 holds without modification of the proof.
We now show for this simplified setting that multiple equilibria exist as in the main
text. In particular, we prove that the asymmetric equilibria described in Proposition 3
still exist:
Proposition 7. There exists an asymmetric threshold equilibria for every n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}
for small enough ψ: player 1 plays B if and only if T1 ≥ n + 1 and player 2 plays B if
and only if Z2 ≥ n+ 1 and T2 ≥ n.
Proof. The proof is mostly unchanged compared to the proof of Proposition 3. There are
two exceptions:
2. Equivalently, now take the behavior of player 1 as given.
(c) Z2 = n+ 1: Here we have to take care of four subcases:
ii. T2 = n: Note that P (T1 = n|T2 = n ∧ Z2 = n + 1) = ψ, and thus, the
payoff of playing B is given by ψ(−L) + (1 − ψ)M . From this we can
determine ψ¯2 :=
M
L+M
> 0 such that for all ψ ≤ ψ¯2 playing B is optimal
for player 2, i.e. where the expected payoff of playing B is non-negative.
iii. T2 > n: Hence T1 ≥ n+ 1 for sure, player 2 chooses B.
Again, we can choose a small enough ψ, i.e., ψ ≤ min{ψ1, ψ¯2}, such that the strategy
profile from the proposition is indeed an equilibrium.
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